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Abstract
We develop a non-rational expectation econometric model of sequential
schooling decisions. Using unique Italian panel data in which individual dif-
ferences in attitudes toward risk are measurable (with error), we investigate
the effect of risk aversion on the probability of entering higher education.
This allows us to characterize the subjective (as opposed to the objective)
effect of higher education on marginal risk exposure. Because the measure
of risk aversion (the classical Arrow-Pratt degree of absolute risk aversion)
is posterior to schooling decisions, it depends on current wealth realizations
and we must therefore take into account its endogeneity. We also allow risk
aversion to be measured with error. After taking into account both the en-
dogeneity of wealth and measurement error, we find that risk aversion is a
key determinant (comparable to parents’ educational background) of the de-
cisions to enter higher education. Precisely, risk aversion acts as a deterrent
to higher education investment.
Key Words: Risk Aversion, Ex-ante risk, schooling, subjective beliefs,
dynamic discrete choices.
JEL Classification: J24.
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1 Introduction
Measuring the relationship between risk attitudes and educational choices
is a long standing problem in labor economics. This is largely explained
by the multiplicity of channels by which schooling may affect risk exposure.
Some of these may come from the supply side, while others come from the
demand side. Focussing on the supply side, higher education requires to face
both direct and psychic costs while academic success may have an inherent
random component. On top of this, uncertainty about labor market abilities
may also represent a certain form of ex-ante risk.
At the same time, from the demand side perspective, schooling may affect
the probability distribution of future labor market outcomes.1 In the long
run, labor market productivity and earnings may be affected by technological
changes, which may be viewed as an additional element of risk from the
perspective of the student. On the other hand, when schooling is viewed as
facilitating adjustment to technological change, this uncertainty may turn
out to favor schooling acquisition (i.e. schooling is a form of insurance). For
all these reasons, it is difficult to say whether or not individuals perceive
higher education as a truly risky investment, or as a form of insurance.
This paper addresses the following question: Does risk aversion increase
or decrease the probability of attending higher education? In order to answer
this question, we propose an approach that departs from standard methods
which would consist of measuring the marginal risk associated to schooling
for all relevant labor market outcomes. Such an approach may turn out to
be unproductive if individuals have imperfect information about the distrib-
ution functions that generate future labor market outcomes and, instead, are
endowed with subjective probabilities that diverge from the objective prob-
ability distributions of post-schooling (observable) outcomes. Obviously, in
such a case, the Rational Expectation hypothesis has no identifying power
and post-schooling panel data on wages and employment outcomes become
irrelevant for the purpose of estimating an ex-ante model.2
1For instance, schooling may reduce earnings dispersion by reducing the incidence of
unemployment or by raising the job offer probabilities (given unemployment) but it may
increase wage volatility if more educated workers find jobs in sectors or occupations where
wages (or marginal product) is more volatile.
2In a pure Rational Expectations framework, evaluating the marginal risk would require
a statistical analysis of the joint distribution of life cycle wages, unemployment, job offer
probabilities and grade completion (or failure) probabilities. In particular, it would also
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Instead, we propose to measure differences in school continuation proba-
bilities, conditional on individual specific risk aversion. Using unique Italian
panel data (the Bank of Italy Survey of Income and Wealth) in which indi-
vidual differences in attitudes toward risk are measurable, we develop a non-
rational expectation econometric model of sequential schooling decisions.3
We infer the subjective effect of continuing to a higher grade level on mar-
ginal risk exposure, from the estimated effect of risk aversion on the decision
to attend higher education. We take into account the potential endogeneity
of risk aversion. Our measure is posterior to schooling decisions. Therefore,
it depends on current wealth, on background risk, and on individual specific
(time invariant) risk aversion. We also allow wealth to depend on individual
specific risk aversion .
Our method is based on two fundamental assumptions; namely that (i)
choices be made sequentially and, (ii) preferences are time invariant (there
must exist an individual specific, time invariant, degree of risk aversion).
More specifically, we use the lottery pricing to construct a measure of ab-
solute risk aversion (the Arrow-Pratt measure) and assume that it is com-
posed of two (separately additive) parts; one containing the effect of wealth,
background risk and individual specific risk aversion, and a residual measure-
ment error component. In order to allow for non orthogonality between risk
aversion and wealth, we also model the distribution of the non-inherited por-
tion of wealth (as measured in 1995) as a function of individual specific risk
aversion, schooling, parents backgrounds, and various instruments affecting
the transitory part of wealth.
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical paper that finds a signifi-
cant effect of risk aversion on the probability of entering higher education.
Our results indicate clearly that risk aversion is a key determinant of the
probability to continue to higher education, Precisely, risk aversion acts as
a deterrent to higher education investment. Indeed, we find that individual
require to disentangle persistent unobserved (from the econometrician perspective) het-
erogeneity from true dispersion, as in Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005). This would
be difficult to achieve and indeed, as of now, such a comprehensive study does not exist.
3Because we do not model how subjective distributions are inferred, the model is not
necessarily inconsistent with a standard rational expectation framework. However, we use
the term non-rational expectations in order to differentiate our approach from the struc-
tural dynamic expected utility models, in which Bellman equations are solved explicitly,
for a given set of beliefs. Keane and Wolpin (1997) is the seminal piece in the structural
literature on schooling. See Belzil (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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risk aversion is virtually as important as parental education in explaining
access to higher education. The disincentive effect of risk aversion on the
decision to enter higher education is robust to the allowance for risk aversion
to affect the decision to continue to senior high school, conditional on termi-
nating junior high school. Our results also point out to the impossibility of
treating measured risk aversion as exogenous. Measurement error is found
to be very important.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2, we present some back-
ground material and review the most important literature. In Section 3, we
present a brief description of the Italian schooling system. In Section 4, we
discuss the Bank of Italy Survey of Income and Wealth (SHIW) and provide
details about the measure of risk aversion used in our analysis. The econo-
metric model is described in Section 5. Section 6 contains a brief overview of
the model specifications. The main empirical results are in Section 7. The
economic interpretation of the results, along with the conclusion, are found
in Section 8.
2 Background an Relevant Literature
As of now, most of the work devoted to the link between risk and school-
ing has been theoretical in nature and often confined to relatively stylized
two-period models. In general, theoretical results stress that earnings un-
certainty may depress human capital investment (Lehvari and Weiss, 1974,
and Olson, White and Sheffrin,1979). Empirical work remains scarce and is
rather inconclusive. This is understandable. The degree of complexity that
characterizes the effect of schooling on risk exposure is high.
In the earlier literature, a few descriptive analyses of the variability of
empirical age/earnings profile have been carried out. Mincer (1974) investi-
gates how the variance of earnings differs across schooling levels over the life
cycle while Chiswick and Mincer (1972) use age earnings profile to investigate
time series changes in income inequality. However, the notion of variability
is usually an “ex post” notion which may have little to do with “ex ante”
risk. In the more recent wage inequality literature, it is customary to ana-
lyze wage dispersion (basically the variance) within education groups. More
recently, Lemieux (2006) shows that the variance of wages is higher within
the more educated group and discusses the increase in college enrollments
that took place during the period over which rising wage inequality has been
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documented for the US.
Focussing on risk (as opposed to heterogeneity), Shaw (1996) develops
a model of the joint investment in financial wealth and human wealth to
show that human capital investment is an inverse function of the degree of
relative risk aversion. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and
according to the theory, she finds that wage growth is positively correlated
with preferences for risk taking. Differently from us she measures individual-
specific risk aversion using information on the allocation of wealth to risky
financial assets or from a survey question about that desired allocation. She
also finds that more educated individuals are also more likely to be risktakers
however she does not address the endogeneity issue between education and
risk aversion. In a recent paper, Palacios-Huerta (2003) presents an empirical
comparison of the properties of risk-adjusted rates of return to schooling
within an intertemporal model, using mean-variance spanning techniques,
but does not model individual decisions.4 Chen (2006) analyses the effect of
higher education on the variance of the log wage regression, using standard
sample selectivity arguments, but disregards attitudes toward risk in her
analysis. Therefore, it is important to note that, as of now, the link between
ex-ante risk and schooling has not been established empirically.5
Knowing the degree of education selectivity based on individual differ-
ences in risk aversion is fundamental. For instance, the relatively insignifi-
cant change in college enrollment that has been observed in the 1990’s after
the well documented increase in returns to schooling that took place over the
80’s in the US (and in other countries), documented in Card and Lemieux
(2000), suggests that behavior toward risk may be a possible explanation.
Economists are currently unable to say if (and to what extent) schooling
acquisition is a risky investment although the issue is starting to raise a
significant level of interest. However, as indicated by the recent surge in
empirical papers devoted to the issue, the link between risk and education is
now regarded as an important topic.6
4Basically, the mean-variance spanning technique amounts to quantifying the effect of
introducing a new asset on the mean-variance of another benchmark asset.
5The distinction between inequality and ex-ante risk is discussed in Cunha and Heck-
man (2007).
6For instance, Labour Economics devotes an entire (forthcoming) issue to this single
topic.
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3 The Schooling System in Italy
The Italian schooling system is composed of four levels: elementary, lower
high school, upper high school and college. Elementary school is typically
attained at age 11 (equivalent to 5th grade) and lower secondary school is
typically attained at age 14 (equivalent to 8th grade). For the period under
consideration the compulsory schooling was elementary school until 1962 and
lower secondary afterwards. The reform of compulsory schooling in 1962 does
not have implications on our analysis because we look at the effect of risk
aversion only on senior high school and college. Compulsory schooling laws
explain the high percentage of those who have elementary (14%) or lower
secondary school (32%) as the highest attained degree in Table 1. Table 1
also shows that the percentage of the population with a college degree is
much lower in Italy (14%) than in the US and that a large fraction (38%)
of the Italian population holds a secondary school degree. There are four
types of secondary schools: Liceo are the traditional high school to access
university level education. Other choices are technical, vocational schools
or art schools and schools for teachers. These choices give also an optional
access to university and at the same time develop professional and technical
skills. After lower secondary school, one may also choose professional 3-
years courses which do not grant access to university but provide skills for
determined professions. In our data these are coded as lower secondary.
Typically the secondary school (or senior high school) title is attained at age
18. At this age a year of military service is compulsory but can be postponed
to the end of university studies for those who decide to go to college (also
referred to as higher education).
4 The Bank of Italy Survey of Income and
Wealth
The 1995 survey of SHIW collects information on consumption, income and
wealth in addition to several household characteristics for a representative
sample of 8,135 Italian households.
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4.1 Measuring Risk Aversion
The 1995 survey contains a question designed to elicit risk aversion attitudes.
Each head of household is asked to report the maximum price he/she is willing
to pay to participate to an hypothetical lottery. The question is worded as
follows:
“We would now like to ask you a hypothetical question that we would
like you to answer as if the situation was a real one. You are offered the
opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the same probability,
either to gain a net amount of 10 million lire (roughly 5,000 dollars) or to
lose all the capital invested. What is the most you are prepared to pay for
this security?”7
The respondent can answer in three possible ways: 1) give the maximum
price he/she is willing to pay, which we denote as bet; 2) don’t know; 3) don’t
want to participate. Of the 8,135 heads of household, 3,483 answered they
were willing to participate and reported a positive maximum price they were
willing to bet (prices equal to zero are not considered a valid response).
The question has a large number of non responses because many respon-
dents may have considered it too difficult. For our purposes the relationship
between non-response and schooling is of particular interest. Those who re-
sponded to the lottery question are on average 6 years younger than the total
sample and have higher shares of male-headed households (79.8 compared to
74.4 percent), of married people (78.9 and 72.5 percent respectively), of self-
employed (17.9 and 14.2 percent) and of public sector employees (27.5 and
23.3 percent respectively). They are also somewhat wealthier and slightly
better educated (1.3 more years of schooling). However, the small differ-
ence in education between the total sample and the sample of respondents
seems to suggest that - in so far as education is also a proxy for better
understanding- non-responses can be ascribed only partly to differences in
the ability to understand the question.
At a theoretical level, it is easy to show that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the value attached to the lottery and the degree of risk
aversion. For a given wealth wi, and a potential gain gi = 10 million lire, the
7In other words, the expected value of entering the lottery is 0.5 · (10, 000, 000 − bet).
The interviews were conducted by professional interviewers at the respondents’ homes
and to help the respondent to understand the question the interviewers showed them an
illustrative card and were ready to provide explanations (for more details see Guiso and
Paiella, 2005).
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optimal bet beti, must solve the expected utility equation:
Ui(wi) =
1
2
Ui(wi + gi) +
1
2
Ui(wi − beti) = EU(wi +Ri) (1)
where Ri represents the return (random) of the lottery. Taking a second-
order expansion, and noting that Ri is also the maximum purchase price
beti, we get that
EU(wi +Ri) ≈ Ui(wi) + U
′
i(wi)E(Ri) +
1
2
U
′′
i (wi)E(Ri)
2 (2)
It is therefore possible to express risk aversion as a function of the parameters
of the lottery and the value of the bet of each individual. Substituting (2)
into (1), we obtain the following expression for the Arrow-Pratt measure of
absolute risk aversion (Guiso and Paiella, 2001):
A(wi) 
−U
′′
i (wi)
U
′
i (wi)
= 4(5−
beti
2
)/(102 + bet2i ) (3)
In general, the degree of risk aversion depends on Ui(.), on consumer
endowment wi, and on background risk. The valid responses to the question
- bet - range from 1,000 lire to 100 million lire (in equation 3 the variables are
scaled by 1 million lire). Of the 3,483 heads with a positive bet, 3,358 have
an A(wi) > 0 which implies that they are risk averse individuals, 125 are risk
neutral and 44 are risk lovers. Although the majority of the respondents are
risk averse and only 5% of the sample is either risk-neutral or risk-loving,
there is a large heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion within the risk
averse individuals which shows that preferences are very heterogenous with
respect to risk.
Guiso and Paiella (2001) discuss in details the main advantages of this
estimate of absolute risk aversion relative to those already in the literature.
They underline that the lottery represents a relatively large risk. In fact,
ten million lire corresponds to just over 5,000 dollars and the ratio of the
expected gain of the hypothetical lottery to the annual average Italian house-
hold consumption is 16 percent. This is an advantage since expected utility
maximizers may behave as risk neutral individuals with respect to small risks
even if they are risk-averse to larger risks. Thus, facing consumers with a
relatively large lottery may be a good strategy to elicit risk attitudes.
It should be noted that this measure of risk requires no assumption on the
form of the individual utility function and extends to risk-averse, risk-neutral
9
and risk-loving individuals. This lottery question has been used to study the
relationship between risk aversion and several household decisions.8
4.2 Wealth
The SHIW data are particularly accurate in the measurement of household
wealth. Wealth is defined as the total of financial and real assets net of house-
hold debt. Financial wealth is given by the sum of cash balances, checking
accounts, savings accounts, postal deposits, government paper, corporate
bonds, mutual funds and investment in fund units and stocks. Real assets
include investment real estate, business wealth, primary residence and the
stock of durables.
We also identify five variables which measure unexpected changes in
wealth. Such measures are the capital gain on one’s first house property9, the
age of the father of the head of household (six dummies: father born before
1910, born 1910-1919 and born 1920-29...born after 1950) as a proxy of in-
herited wealth, an indicator of house ownership as a result of gift or bequest,
the sum of settlements received related to life, health, theft and casualty
insurance and the contributions (in money or gifts) received from friends or
family living outside the household dwelling. These variables are indicated
in Table 1 as capital_house, six dummies coh_f, housegift, insurance and
friendsmoney.
8Guiso and Paiella (2005) use the question on risk aversion to analyze occupation choice,
portfolio selection, insurance demand, investment in education (in the linear OLS case)
and migration decisions. They find substantial effects of this measure of risk aversion in
ways that are consistent with the theory i.e. that more risk averse individuals choose lower
returns in exchange for lower risk. They find for example that being risk averse increases
the probability of being self-employed by 36% of the sample mean and the probability of
holding risky assets by 42% of the sample mean. They also find that being risk averse as
opposed to being risk neutral or risk prone (i.e. they use a risk-averse dummy), lowers
education by one year on average.
9This is a measure of windfall gains (or losses) on housing constructed using data on
house prices at the province level over the years 1980-1994. For homeowners, we compute
the house price change since the year when the house was acquired or since 1980 if it was
acquired earlier. To tenants, we attach the house price change since the year when they
started working or since 1980. This can be justified on the ground that they start saving
to buy a home as soon as they start working.
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4.3 Background risk
In a world of incomplete markets, risk aversion may vary not only because of
heterogeneity in tastes but also because individuals face environments that
differ in terms of background risk.10 As a measure of background risk we
take two proxies.
The first measure of background risk is intended to be a measure of ag-
gregate risk at the local level. It is obtained in the following way: For each
province we regress the log of GDP per capita in 1980-1995 on a time trend
and compute the variance of the residuals. We then attach this estimate
to all households living in the same province. This measure is significantly
positively related to risk aversion.
The second measure of background risk is based on four questions on
labor income expectations that are asked to half of the overall sample in a
special section of the 1995 SHIW questionnaire. Since these questions were
addressed to only half the sample and of those interviewed only about 60%
replied, the number of valid observations is vastly reduced (940) with respect
to the number of those who responded to the risk aversion question (3,483).
Households were asked four questions on the perceived probability of being
employed over the twelve months following the interview and the variation in
earnings if employed. We use this information to construct a measure of the
coefficient of variation of the distribution of future earnings following Guiso,
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002). The employed and job seekers are asked to
report, on a scale from 0 to 100, their chances of keeping their job or finding
one in the next twelve months - denote as p. Each individual assigning a
positive probability to being employed is then asked to report the minimum
-minlav- and the maximum -maxlav- income he expects to earn if employed
and the probability of earning less than the midpoint of the distribution of
future earnings -probltx- conditional on working. These data (minlav, maxlav
and probltx) can be combined to obtain an estimate of expected earnings -
E(y)- and their variance -V ar(y)- which we use to proxy background risk.11
The coefficient of variation cv = sd(x)
E(x)
is calculated using:
E(x) = pE(y) + (1− p)b
V ar(x) = pV ar(y) + p(1− p)[E(y)− b]2
10See Gollier (2001).
11The formula used is on page 252 of Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002).
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where b is a measure of imputed expected unemployment benefits.12
4.4 Sample selection
Apart from the lottery question, we use information on the level of education
attained by the head of household, as well as variables such as age, gender,
region of birth, parental education and parental occupation. This set of
variables is comparable to those which are used in US studies based on the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS). We select the sample of all heads with
a valid answer to the lottery question (3,483) and eliminate those who report
a missing value in any of the following variables: education, age, gender,
region of birth, education and occupation of the head’s father and mother,
subjective measure of income uncertainty. This selection process leaves us
with a final sample of 940 heads of household.
The original schooling variable takes five possible values (1 to 5) corre-
sponding to no education, elementary school (typically attained at 11 years
of age), junior high school (attained at 14), senior high school (attained at
18), university degree (attained at 23-24).13
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample. In the estima-
tion we use dummy variables derived from the original variables. There are
five dummy variables indicating the level of education attained by the in-
dividual (no qualification, elementary school, lower high school, upper high
school, university degree or higher), three dummies - north, centre and south-
for the region of birth, one sex dummy (female=1), and a complete set
age/cohort indicators.14 In addition we have one dummy each - edu_father
and edu_mother - respectively for the level of education attained by the indi-
vidual’s father and mother (less than high school=0, high school or more=1),
and four occupation dummies for blue collar, white collar, self employed
and unoccupied for each parents’ occupation. These variables are denoted
bluecollar_f, whitecollar_f, selfempl_f, unempl_f for the father and bluecol-
lar_m, whitecollar_m, selfempl_m, unempl_m for the mother. There also
12We thank Luigi Pistaferri for providing his routines to impute benefits.
13We actually have information about post-university degree, but the number of indi-
viduals being too small, we cannot really estimate the transition to post-graduate studies.
14These binary indicators are 20-25, 26-30, 31-35,....until 75 or more. This may be
important as, before 1968, legal restrictions limited the accession to college only to those
who had a high school degree in classical or scientific studies, since 1968 accession to
college is open to any type of high school degree.
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the measures of background risk (var_gdp and subj_risk) and of wealth and
the exogenous changes in wealth explained above.
Table 2 describes the empirical distribution of our measure of risk aversion
A(wi) in the sample of 940 heads. The proportion of risk-neutral and risk-
averse individuals is very similar to the one in the sample of 3,483 families
(around 5%), the distribution of A(wi) looks similar to the original sample of
3,483 families with a valid response to the lottery question (second column
of Table 2).
5 The Econometric Model
We model schooling decisions as a reduced-form dynamic discrete choice
model in which the hazard function (the drop-out rate) depends on measures
of parental background, individual specific heterogeneity and an individual
specific measure of permanent risk aversion. The grade transition model
may be regarded as an approximation to a sequential dynamic programming
model, in which subjective beliefs are not specified. This particular aspect
of the grade transition model is the cornerstone of our econometric method-
ology, since we do not want to impose any distributional assumptions on
subjective beliefs.15 Our method is therefore based on two fundamental as-
sumptions; namely that (i) choices be made sequentially and, (ii) preferences
are time invariant (there must exist an individual specific, time invariant,
degree of risk aversion).
5.1 A Model of Grade Transition
The conditional probability (hazard rate) of stopping at grade g for individual
i, denoted Hgi, is denoted;
Hg,i = Λ(Ug,i) for g = 1, 2, ..G (4)
where
Ug,i = αg,i + β
′
gXi + δg · RAi (5)
15Precisely, we do not want to dictate how higher education affects the second (or higher)
moment (s) of
13
and where G is the second highest grade level (senior high school). In our
framework, HG,i is the probability of dropping out after having completed
senior high school (the probability of entering higher education is (1−HG,i).
Similarly, HG−1,i is the drop out probability after completing junior high
school. The term αg,i represents an individual/grade specific intercept term,
Xi is a vector of observable characteristics, and β
′
g represents a grade specific
vector of parameters measuring the effects of these characteristics. The vari-
able RAi represents the permanent part of individual specific risk aversion
and δg is a grade specific parameter. Note that the model is general enough
to take into account that the marginal effect of risk aversion may be positive
at some grade level and negative at another. This would be important if
marginal risk exposure changes substantially with grade level.16
We assume that
αg,i = α0g + αg · θi
and that θi is drawn from an unknown distribution which is approximated by
a discrete distribution with K points of support. As we include an intercept
term in the transition probability, we normalize one support point (namely
θ1) to 0.
Λ(.) is approximated with a mixture of 5 normal random variables: that
is
Λ(.) =
M=5∑
m=1
P gm · Φ(.;µ
g
m, σ
g
m)
where P gm is the mixing probability and Φ(µ
g
m, σ
g
m) denotes the normal cumu-
lative distribution function with mean µm and variance σ
2
m. Further details
are presented in sub-section 5.4.
5.2 A Model of Absolute Risk Aversion
As the risk aversion information contained in the SHIW is posterior to the
period when schooling decisions were made, we construct a non-linear factor
model that allows to identify individual specific permanent risk aversion.
16This is indeed likely to happen because the supply side risks (such as the failure
probability) are likely to be located mostly at university level while the demand side
risk may entail marginal risk variability at lower grade levels (for instance, earnings risk
exposure may change substantially when going from junior high school to senior high
school).
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We first specify a flexible model of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver-
sion, Ai,95(.), which is assumed of the following form
Ai,95(.) = A¯i,95(Wealthi,95, Background risk,Rai) + ε
r
i,95 (6)
where A¯(.) denotes a second degree polynomial, and where εri,95 is an error
term motivated by the presence of measurement error. It is distributed with
density fR(). Rai, is the time invariant degree of risk aversion, upon which,
schooling decisions depend. The background risk variables include the vari-
ance of GDP at the province level and a measure of subjective risk exposure,
which was described earlier.
The wealth equation is given by
Wealthi,95 = γX ·Xi + γS · Si + Zi,95γZ + γR · Rai + ε
w
i,95
= WiγW + ε
w
i,95 (7)
where εwi,95 is distributed with density f
W (). The vector of parameter, γX ,
measures the effect of parents’ background variables on risk aversion while
the parameter γS allows us to detect if (or to what extent) wealth (and in-
directly risk aversion) is explained by education. The vector Zi,95 contains a
set of variables measured in 1995, and which may explain the transitory part
of risk aversion. These variables include the capital gain on house property,
the indicators dummies of the age of the father of the head of household, an
indicator of house ownership as a result of gift or bequest, the sum of settle-
ments received related to life, health, theft and casualty insurance and the
contributions (in money or gifts) received from friends or family. These vari-
ables are indicated in Table 1 as capital_house, six dummies coh_f, housegift,
insurance and friendsmoney.
To close the model , we approximate both f r(.) and fw() with a mixture
of 5 unrestricted normal densities;
f s(.) =
M=5∑
m=1
P sm · φ(.;µ
s
m, σ
s
m) for s =W,R (8)
where φ(.;µsm, σ
s
m) denotes the normal density with mean µ
s
m and standard
deviation σsm.
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5.3 Heterogeneity
Because we have a relatively complicated non-linear factor structure, and we
have only a limited number of measurements on risk aversion, the distribution
of the time invariant portion of risk aversion is difficult to identify. To perform
estimation, we partition the domain of the permanent risk aversion factor into
6 points;
{Ra1 = −0.02, Ra2 = 0.05, Ra3 = 0.12, Ra4 = 0.14, Ra5 = 0.17, Ra6 = 0.20}
These points are chosen to cover the same region as the Arrow-Pratt
measure obtained in 1995. These support points, along with their respec-
tive type probabilities, define the degree of heterogeneity in risk aversion.17
Alongside, and in order to obtain full flexibility, we allow each risk aversion
type to be endowed with a type specific set of grade hazard rate intercepts,
αgi. Altogether, a type k is defined as the subset of the population endowed
with {α1k, α2k , α3k, α4k, Rak}.
5.4 Further Parameterization
In order to estimate the model with normal mixtures and unobserved het-
erogeneity, the following parametrizations have been adopted.
Basically, we formulate the grade transition model as a mixture of normals
with unit variance. To obtain identification, we impose the standard labeling
condition (the components are ordered in ascending order in terms of their
means: µg1 < µ
g
2... < µ
g
5), and for one component (the 3rd one), we set the
mean (µg3) to 0. We do this because Xi contains an intercept term (the
individual specific heterogeneity term).
Finally, we proceed similarly for the wealth and the risk aversion equa-
tions. However, for both cases, we also estimate the variance (the σrm and
σwm) for each mixture component.
Type probabilities:
pk,=
exp(p0k)∑
6
j=1
exp(p0j)
for k = 1, 2, ..6 and p06 = 0
Grade transitions (normal mixtures):
17An alternative would be to define the residual of the risk aversion equation as indi-
vidual specific risk aversion heterogeneity. However, this would only be valid in absence
of measurement error.
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P gm =
exp(pg∗m )∑
5
j=1
exp(pg∗
j
)
for m = 1, 2 , ..5 and pg∗5 = 0
µg1 = − exp(µ
g∗
1 )− exp(µ
g∗
2 ),
µg2 = − exp(µ
g∗
2 ),
µg3 = 0,
µg4 = exp(µ
g∗
4 ),
µg5 = exp(µ
g∗
4 ) + exp(µ
g∗
5 )
σgm = 1 for m = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Relative Risk aversion (normal mixtures):
P rm =
exp(pr∗m )∑
5
j=1
exp(pr∗
j
)
for m = 1, 2 , ..5 and pr∗5 = 0
µr1 = − exp(µ
r∗
1 )− exp(µ
r∗
2 ),
µr2 = − exp(µ
r∗
1 ),
µr3 = 0,
µr4 = exp(µ
r∗
4 ),
µr5 = exp(µ
r∗
4 ) + exp(µ
r∗
5 )
σrm = exp(σ
r∗
m) for m = 1, 2, ..5
Wealth equation (normal mixtures):
Pwm =
exp(pw∗m )∑
5
j=1
exp(pw∗
j
)
for m = 1, 2 , ..5 and pw∗5 = 0
µw1 = − exp(µ
w∗
1 )− exp(µ
w∗
2 ),
µw2 = − exp(µ
w∗
2 ),
µw3 = 0,
µw4 = exp(µ
w∗
4 ),
µw5 = exp(µ
w∗
4 ) + exp(µ
w∗
5 )
σwm = exp(σ
w∗
m ) for m = 1, 2, ..5
5.5 Estimation
We estimate the model by maximum (mixed) likelihood techniques. The
contribution to the likelihood for an individual i, who has completed level g,
who is endowed with a wealth level Wealthi,95 and who reports a degree of
absolute risk aversion Ai,95(.), is denoted Li, and is equal to
Li =
∑K
k=1 pk · [Π
g−1
s=1(1−Hs,i(Xi | typek))
s ·Hg,i(Xi, | typek)
·fR(Ai,95 − (A¯i,95 | typek))·
fW (Wealthnii,95 − (WiγW | typek))]
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where both fR(.) and fW (.) are given by (8). The likelihood function is
maximized using a Fortran based IMSL routine.
6 An Overview of the Model Specifications
In order to illustrate the potential endogeneity of risk aversion, we first esti-
mate a model of grade transition in which the degree of absolute risk aversion
(as measured in 1995) is taken as exogenous. This specification (referred to as
Model 1) ignores the potential endogeneity of wealth, as well as measurement
error. As a second step, we estimate the most general model specification
in which risk aversion depends on wealth endowments and background risk
variables (variance of GDP and the subjective risk measure) and in which
wealth depends on long run factors such as education, relative risk aversion
(the permanent portion) as well as transitory factors. This specification is
referred to as Model 2. In both Model 1 and Model 2, we allow risk aver-
sion to enter the last two stages of the decision making (transition to senior
high school (given junior high school) and the transition to higher education
(given completion of senior high school)). Finally, in Model 3, we re-evaluate
the effect of risk aversion on the decision to enter higher education under the
hypothesis that it is only relevant for the transition to higher education. We
do this because decisions to go to senior high school are made at young age,
and may therefore be influenced mostly by parents’ background.
Because the model is highly non-linear and contains a large number of
parameters (more than 200), it is more appealing to focus the discussion on
the illustration of the marginal effects on the grade transition probabilities.18
For this reason, the entire set of parameters is found in appendix.
7 Empirical Results
As there exists a large literature which documents the determinant of school-
ing attainments, we focus our discussion on the effect of relative risk aversion
on grade transitions (principally from senior high school to higher education
but also from junior to senior high school.
18The degree of flexibility reached by using mixture of normals when modeling grade
transition, wealth, and relative risk aversion is the main reason for the proliferation of
parameters.
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7.1 What is the effect of risk aversion on grade tran-
sitions?
Given the form of the hazard specification, it is important to note that the
sign of the parameter estimates indicates the direction of the effect of a vari-
able on the exit rate out of school. So, for instance, a positive (negative)
estimate for the effect of risk aversion will typically imply that individuals
who are more risk averse tend to have a higher (lower) drop out rate. For
a particular grade level already completed, a positive effect of risk aversion
therefore indicates that individuals regard entering the next grade level as
risky, while a negative estimate would be consistent with the reverse argu-
ment (the insurance hypothesis).
In order to illustrate the results, we first computed the average hazard
rates at three different levels of the individual specific (persistent) absolute
risk aversion parameter; a low value corresponding to risk loving (Ra =
−0.02), the population average and a high degree of risk aversion (Ra =
0.20). These values span virtually the entire spectrum of the Arrow-Pratt
measure computed in 1995. For the sake of comparison, and in order to
provide a benchmark, we compare the effect of risk aversion to the effect of
having been raised by parents who have both reached senior high school or
higher education.
The drop-out rates are in Table 3, while the associated marginal effects
(with standard errors) are found in Table 4. Without loss of generality, we
calculate these hazard rates for type 1 individuals and for the modal occupa-
tion and region. We do this so that we can more easily compare risk aversion
with parents’ education (a key determinant of schooling attainments).
When endogeneity in risk aversion is ignored (Model 1), the marginal
effect of risk aversion on the exit rate is positive for the transition to senior
high school transition and negative for the transition to higher education.
However, either the small difference between hazard rates calculated at Ra =
−0.02 and at Ra = 0.20 (which are equal to 0.40 and 0.42 respectively) or
the implied marginal effect found in table 4 (0.0050), indicate a very small
effect for risk aversion. While the sign is reversed for the higher education
transition, the marginal effect is even smaller (-0.0015). For the moment, we
do not pay more attention to this sign reversal.
As argued earlier, the model that assumes exogenous risk aversion is
questionable for 2 main reasons. First, risk aversion (as measured by 1995)
is likely to be affected by current wealth which may have been affected by
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both long run factors (such as schooling) and transitory factors. Secondly,
risk aversion is likely to be measured with error. Model 2 and Model 3 take
these two issues into account.
There are two striking results. First, allowing for endogeneity causes a
sign reversal in the effect of risk aversion on drop out rates. Given senior high
school completion, we find that more risk averse individuals are more likely to
drop after senior high school and disregard the higher education option. This
is true in both Model 2 and Model 3 and it is consistent with the standard
view that individuals regard higher education as risky. However, under the
assumption that the degree of risk aversion is an input to the decision to
continue to senior high school (Model 2), young individuals who are more
risk averse are less likely to drop after junior high school.
The second striking result is the much higher marginal effects associated
to risk aversion in both Model 1 and Model 2. Let’s first focus on Model 2.
At the junior high school-senior high school transition, the average drop out
rate of those who are risk lover is equal to 0.41 while it is 0.28 for those who
have strong risk aversion (Table 3). At the higher education transition, the
equivalent numbers range from 0.44 to 0.53. The relevant marginal effects
(-0.0323) and 0.0350, found in Table 4, are indeed much higher in absolute
term than in Model 1.
As the literature focuses on college (higher education) decisions, and as
our estimates indicate that the effect of risk aversion depends on which grade
level transition is considered, it is particularly important to investigate the
robustness of the results for the higher education choice. In order to do this,
we estimate a model (Model 3) where risk aversion affects only the decision to
go to college. The results found in the 3rd column of both Table 3 and Table
4 still indicate that more risk averse individuals tend to drop after senior
high school and opt out of higher education. The difference between the
drop out of risk lovers (0.45) and risk averse individuals (0.49) has dropped
slightly but it remains comparable to the effect of parents’ education (which
ranges from 0.44 to 0.47). To summarize, the results still point out to higher
education as a risky investment.
7.2 Is Risk Aversion Important?
The effect of parental education is the natural benchmark marginal effect to
use for comparison. The effect of parents’ education is computed in Tables
3, 4 and 5 as the difference in the drop out rate between individuals raised in
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families where both parents have reached senior high school degree or higher
and individuals who belong to families where neither parent holds a senior
high school degree. As documented in Tables 3 and 4, having both parents
educated has an important effect on the drop out probability. More precisely,
until one has reached senior high school, parents’ education appear to be the
dominant factor. However, our results indicate that the decision to attend
higher education is dominated by attitudes toward risk.
In order to get a clearer picture, we decomposed the individual differences
in drop out rates into two separate components; risk aversion and parents
education. These estimates, found in Table 5, indicate that differences in
risk aversion can account to up to 56% (in Model 2) and 46% (in Model 3) of
the total variation in drop out rates before higher education. Risk aversion
accounts only for 12% of the variation in drop out rates before senior high
school enrollment.
Our findings are also robust to the inclusion of other instruments such as
liquidity constraints indicators, and other variables such as state transfers,
which are used in Guiso and Paiella (2001).19 To summarize, risk aversion
is a key determinant of the decisions to enter higher education. In terms of
importance, risk aversion is comparable to parents’ educational background.
7.3 The Distribution of Risk Aversion and Measure-
ment Error
In order to estimate the model, we must also estimate the distribution of
the time invariant part of the risk aversion measure. This allows to separate
the degree of absolute risk aversion measured in 1995 risk into 3 different
components, one component that depends on wealth and background risk,
another component representing the time invariant portion of risk aversion,
and a residual term capturing measurement error. It is therefore interesting
to compare its distribution to the actual Arrow-Pratt measure inferred in
1995 and evaluate the importance of measurement error.
In both Model 2 and Model 3, we find a measure of absolute risk aver-
sion approximately equal to 0.10 (Table 6). This is lower than the actual
measure inferred in 1995, which is equal to 0.15. As is evident from Table 7,
measurement error is found to be most important. We find that the variance
of the error term is 4 to 5 times as large as the variance of the regression.
19To reduce the burden of table presentation, we do not report them.
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Obviously, this high degree of measurement error explains the very weak cor-
relation between risk aversion measures and grade completion reported in
the empirical literature. Indeed, as reported in Belzil and Leonardi (2006),
there is a very weak correlation between grade attainment and the betting
price.
7.4 The Effect of Wealth and Background Risk on Rel-
ative Risk Aversion
Because the link between risk aversion and its determinants is a complicated
non-linear function, a look at the parameter estimates are not sufficient to
evaluate the impact of all regressors. These effects will depend on the levels
of the variables themselves and the interactions (Table 7). An informal way
to proceed is to regress actual risk aversion on its determinants. Consistent
with what is reported in Guiso and Paiella (2001), we find that risk aversion
decreases with wealth and increases with both measures of background risk
(the subjective income risk and the variance of the province GDP).
Subjective income risk is a measure of background risk and a higher back-
ground risk should be positively correlated with risk aversion. However the
attitude towards risk presumably affects the choice of one’s occupation, and
more risk-averse individuals choose safer occupations. This tends to produce
a negative correlation between earnings risk and risk aversion, counteracting
the background-risk effect. Finally, the degree of risk aversion is increas-
ing in the variance of per capita GDP in the province of residence. This
is presumably a lower bound of the true effect of background risk because
if risk-averse individuals tend to move from high-variance to low-variance
provinces this would tend to generate a negative correlation between risk
aversion and background risk.
7.5 The Effect of Time Invariant Risk Aversion and
Schooling on Wealth?
The estimates of Table 8 indicate that wealth is positively associated with
the individual level of education, as documented by the four dummy vari-
ables associated to different grade levels (higher education is the reference
variable). Not surprisingly, it is also positively correlated with parents’ edu-
cation. Wealth is positively and significantly associated with all four variables
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which we use as exogenous instruments: the dummy for a house received as
gift or bequest, the amount of money received as payment from insurance
or from friends and relatives outside the household and the capital gain on
the property house. Wealth is also positively related to the age of the head’s
father which we use as a proxy of the amount of inherited wealth. Finally,
our model allows us to measure the effect of the individual specific (time
invariant) degree of risk aversion on wealth. As more risk averse individuals
may sometimes save more, but also invest in less risky assets, the sign of risk
aversion on wealth is ambiguous. Our estimates indicate that risk aversion
and wealth are negatively correlated.20
8 Economic Interpretation and Concluding Re-
marks
In conclusion, we find that risk aversion is a key determinant of the decision
to attend higher education and, to a certain extent, senior high school enroll-
ment. More precisely, given senior high school completion, the decision to
continue to higher education is negatively correlated with risk aversion. This
result is robust to the allowance for potential effect of risk aversion at lower
grade transitions. More importantly, it is consistent with standard theoreti-
cal arguments.21 It is also interesting to note that, conditional on senior high
school completion, individual differences in risk aversion are as important as
parents’ educational background (the factor most often cited as the principal
determinant of schooling attainments).
We also find that, conditional on junior high school completion, the de-
cision to go to senior high school is increasing with risk aversion. Unlike for
higher education, this result is harder to interpret, because senior high school
incorporates a variety of academic as well as non academic streams (see Sec-
tion 3). One possible interpretation is that individuals who obtain senior
high school feel that this is a grade level sufficient to give them access to jobs
that reduce their exposure to labor market risk. If reaching higher education
does not reduce further risk exposure (from the demand side perspective),
but entails specific supply side risks that are irrelevant at lower grade levels
20Interestingly, Guiso and Paiella (2001) also show that the negative relationship is
robust to the introduction of the measures of background risk such as the variance of
GDP at the provincial level and subjective (perceived) income uncertainty.
21See Lehvari and Weiss (1974).
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(for instance, when entering senior high school), then the decision to go to
higher education would be negatively affected by risk aversion.
Finally, our results also point out to the impossibility of treating risk
aversion (when measured after schooling decisions were made) as exogenous.
Precisely, both wealth and measurement error are found to be important
determinants of the post-schooling degree of absolute risk aversion.
Obviously, the econometric model is based on an argumentation that
omits heterogeneity in subjective marginal risk evaluation. In a world where
agents differ not only with respect to risk aversion, but also with respect to
subjective probability distributions (some regard higher education as risky,
others regard it as an insurance), the effect of risk aversion would be more
difficult to evaluate. As a consequence, future research targeted at disentan-
gling differences in risk aversion from differences in subjective risk evaluations
appears an interesting avenue for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs mean std dev min max
risk aversion 940 0.149 0.056 -0.04 0.19998
college_more 940 0.141 0.349 0 1
upper_highschool 940 0.383 0.486 0 1
lower_highschool 940 0.321 0.467 0 1
elementary 940 0.143 0.350 0 1
no_qualification 940 0.012 0.108 0 1
edu_father 940 0.105 0.307 0 1
edu_mother 940 0.071 0.257 0 1
north 940 0.387 0.487 0 1
south 940 0.455 0.498 0 1
female 940 0.128 0.334 0 1
bluecollar_f 940 0.464 0.499 0 1
selfempl_f 940 0.304 0.460 0 1
unempl_f 940 0.007 0.086 0 1
bluecollar_m 940 0.123 0.329 0 1
selfempl_m 940 0.123 0.329 0 1
unempl_m 940 0.695 0.461 0 1
age 940 41.897 8.912 20 68
coh_f_before1910 940 0.152 0.359 0 1
coh_f_1910-19 940 0.231 0.422 0 1
coh_f_1920-29 940 0.327 0.469 0 1
coh_f_1930-39 940 0.183 0.387 0 1
coh_f_1940-49 940 0.031 0.173 0 1
coh_f_1950+ 940 0.002 0.046 0 1
wealth 940 284535.900 381216.700 -136000 4654000
housegift 940 0.398 0.999 0 11
insurance 940 399.979 3682.284 0 100000
friendsmoney 940 545.771 5756.831 0 135000
capital_house 940 121257.300 118442.600 -394436 1070542
subj_risk 940 0.186 0.330 0 2.966
var_gdp 940 2.015 5.256 0.0005 22.262
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Table 2: The Individual Specific Arrow Pratt Measure of Risk Aversion
Estimation Original
Sample Sample
Deciles A(w)
1 -0.035 -0.030
2 0.028 0.017
3 0.080 0.080
4 0.115 0.115
5 0.178 0.178
6 0.189 0.193
7 0.197 0.198
8 0.199 0.199
9 0.199 0.199
N obs. 940 3,483
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Table 3: Average grade termination rates by degree of risk aversion and
parents educations
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Risk aversion exogenous endogenous endogenous
Transition to elementary school
Risk aversion - - -
Parents’ educ high 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
low 0.0002 0.0002 0.0020
Elementary to junior high school
Risk aversion - - -
Parents’ educ high 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
low 0.0453 0.0453 0.0456
Junior high school to senior high school
Risk aversion Ra∗i = −0.02 0.4028 0.4114 -
Ra∗i = Ra
∗
i 0.4182 0.3531 -
Ra∗i = 0.20 0.4220 0.2783 -
Parents’ educ high 0.0128 0.0023 0.0064
low 0.3524 0.2148 0.3292
Senior high school to college
Risk aversion Ra∗i = −0.02 0.4634 0.4452 0.4506
Ra∗i = Ra
∗
i 0.4578 0.4807 0.4795
Ra∗i = 0.20 0.4559 0.5324 0.4870
Parents’ educ high 0.3524 0.4435 0.4355
low 0.4519 0.4706 0.4663
Note: The intermediate value for risk aversion (average) are equal to 0.1485
(exogenous) and 0.1059 (endogenous) 0.0952
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Table 4: Grade termination function: Marginal effects
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Risk Aversion exogenous endogenous endogenous
coeff std err coeff std err coeff std err
Transition to elementary school
Risk aversion - - -
Parents’ educ -0.0002 (0.003) -0.0002 (0.003) -0.0002 (0.002)
Elementary to junior high school
Risk aversion - - -
Parents’ educ -0.0453 (0.005) -0.0452 (0.005) -0.0456 (0.010)
Junior high school to senior high school
Risk aversion 0.0050 (0.003) -0.0323 (0.009) -
Parents’ educ -0.3544 (0.087) -0.2125 (0.096) -0.3229 (0.055)
Senior high school to college
Risk aversion -0.0015 (0.007) 0.0350 (0.087) 0.0141 (0.003)
Parents’ educ -0.0896 (0.023) -0.0271 (0.022) -0.0308 (0.006)
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Table 5: The relative explanatory power of risk aversion and parents’ educa-
tion
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Risk Aversion exogenous endogenous endogenous
Junior high school to senior high school
Risk aversion 2% 12% -
Parent’s educ 98% 88% 100%
Senior high school to college
Risk aversion 1% 56% 43%
Parent’s educ 99% 44% 57%
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Table 6: The distribution of time invariant risk aversion
Model 2 Model 3
type probability type probability
Ra∗i = −0.02 0.19 0.24
Ra∗i = 0.05 0.17 0.20
Ra∗i = 0.12 0.16 0.14
Ra∗i = 0.14 0.16 0.13
Ra∗i = 0.17 0.15 0.13
Ra∗i = 0.20 0.17 0.17
average 0.1059 0.0952
st. dev 0.07 0.08
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Table 7: Absolute Risk Aversion equations
Model 2 Model 3
endogenous endogenous
coeff std err coeff std err
Wealth -0.0044 0.0083 0.0206 0.0118
Wealth square 0.0051 0.0007 0.0107 0.0007
var gdp -0.0432 0.0039 0.0046 0.0049
var gdp square -0.0864 0.0038 -0.0009 0.0008
subj risk -0.2064 0.0027 -0.1587 0.0012
subj risk square 0.2178 0.0040 0.2874 0.0018
Wealth*var gdp -0.0002 0.0024 -0.0077 0.0021
Wealth*subj risk -0.0864 0.0097 -0.0468 0.0048
subj risk*var gdp -0.0311 0.0159 -0.0240 0.0129
Ra∗i 0.0021 0.0027 -0.1250 0.0028
Ra∗i square 0.0396 0.0058 0.0804 0.0066
Ra∗i *wealth -0.0494 0.0056 -0.0697 0.0072
Ra∗i *subj risk 0.0851 0.0049 0.1145 0.0032
Ra∗i *var gdp -0.0071 0.0071 0.0124 0.0061
Variance Regression 0.2476 0.2480
Variance Error term 0.8956 1.1261
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Table 8: Wealth equation
Model Model 2 Model 3
Risk aversion endogenous endogenous
coeff std err coeff std err
upper_highschool -0.6822 0.0021 -0.6499 0.0017
lower_highschool -1.4022 0.0015 -1.4001 0.0017
elementary -1.507 0.0011 -1.5061 0.0011
no_qualification -1.4994 0.0009 -1.4996 0.0009
edu_father 0.177 0.0011 0.1857 0.001
edu_mother 1.2917 0.001 1.2944 0.0009
bluecollar_f -0.2383 0.0017 -0.2281 0.002
bluecollar_m 1.0987 0.001 1.0981 0.001
selfempl_f 0.4507 0.0015 0.4682 0.0014
selfempl_m 1.4043 0.0011 1.4009 0.0011
unempl_f -0.5994 0.0009 -0.5998 0.0009
unempl_m 1.1207 0.0031 1.1669 0.0027
north 0.6634 0.0015 0.6751 0.0017
south -0.0903 0.0022 -0.0581 0.0019
female -0.9217 0.0012 -0.9097 0.001
age45more -0.2716 0.0137 -0.1997 0.017
coh_f_1910-19 -0.5095 0.0013 -0.5101 0.0013
coh_f_1920-29 -0.8213 0.0014 -0.8165 0.0015
coh_f_1930-39 -0.7459 0.0014 -0.7272 0.0011
coh_f_1940-49 -0.911 0.001 -0.9063 0.0009
coh_f_1950+ -1.301 0.0009 -1.3005 0.0009
house_gift 0.769 0.0027 0.8078 0.0018
insurance 0.1972 0.0009 0.1983 0.0009
friends_money 0.7966 0.0009 0.7979 0.0009
capital_gain 0.7923 0.0042 0.8165 0.0051
risk_aversion -0.1546 0.0071 -0.2258 0.0078
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Table 1: Appendix. Type probabilities and Normal Mixtures
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
exogenous endogenous endogenous
type probabilities
coeff std err coeff std err coeff std err
P1 -2.8183 0.3823 0.1077 0.002 0.3619 0.0059
P2 -0.5655 0.0771 0.038 0.0011 0.168 0.0035
P3 -0.5798 0.078 -0.061 0.0015 -0.1781 0.0028
P4 0.2996 0.1275 -0.0494 0.0013 -0.2134 0.0034
P5 0.2986 0.1273 -0.079 0.0017 -0.2694 0.0041
grade transition
P g1 -0.1178 0.334 -0.521 0.011 -0.5166 0.007
P g2 0.7077 0.0945 -0.3938 0.0074 -0.3821 0.0051
P g3 4.6237 0.3941 -0.2542 0.0045 -0.2614 0.0035
P g4 -2.8515 0.2256 0.1789 0.0041 -0.1413 0.002
P g5 0 - 0 - 0 -
µg1 1.9031 0.1486 -0.1936 0.0032 -0.1233 0.0011
µg2 -1.9935 0.1419 -0.6828 0.0052 -1.1973 0.0009
µg3 0 - 0 - 0 -
µg4 40.0321 0.2284 2.0476 0.0336 -1.5523 0.0009
µg5 26.3487 0.2392 1.1418 0.0206 0.1462 0.0009
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Table 2: Appendix. Normal Mixtures: risk aversion equation
Model 2 Model 3
endogenous endogenous
coeff std err coeff std err
P r1 -0.6342 0.0166 -0.3689 0.0062
P r2 0.1402 0.0037 0.0836 0.0016
P r3 0.1552 0.0042 0.0902 0.0017
P r4 0.1701 0.0046 0.0973 0.0019
P r5 0 0.0009 0 0.0009
µr1 -1.9926 0.0009 -1.9903 0.0009
µr2 -2.004 0.001 -1.9951 0.0009
µr3 -1 0.0009 -1 0.0009
µr4 -1.9942 0.0009 -1.9956 0.0009
µr5 -1.0114 0.001 -1.0016 0.0009
σr1 0.2172 0.0065 0.3246 0.0071
σr2 -0.0316 0.0023 0.0178 0.0013
σr3 -0.119 0.0044 -0.033 0.0017
σr4 -0.2017 0.0066 -0.0777 0.0023
σr5 -0.2623 0.0093 -0.0773 0.0032
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Table 3: Appendix. Normal Mixtures: wealth equation
Model 2 Model 3
endogenous endogenous
coeff std err coeff std err
Pw1 -0.8148 0.001 -0.8184 0.0009
Pw2 -0.1258 0.003 -0.1727 0.0014
Pw3 -0.4221 0.0011 -0.4318 0.0009
Pw4 -0.5323 0.001 -0.5258 0.0009
Pw5 0 0.0009 0 0.0009
µw1 -1.4988 0.0009 -1.4989 0.0009
µw2 -1.4928 0.001 -1.4955 0.001
µw3 0 0.0009 0 0.0009
µw4 -1.5122 0.001 -1.5092 0.001
µw5 -1.5048 0.001 -1.5045 0.0009
σw1 0.9648 0.0149 1.2227 0.0051
σw2 0.4957 0.0286 0.9929 0.0097
σw3 0.7937 0.0205 1.1485 0.007
σw4 0.9523 0.0164 1.2398 0.0057
σw5 1.6648 0.0053 1.6153 0.0032
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Table 4: Appendix. Parameter estimates: Model 1
Transition to Elementary to Junior high to Senior high to
elementary junior high senior high college
αg1 -4.3925 -3.8904 -1.7909 1.5419
αg2 -4.9126 -4.3504 -1.6655 2.0462
αg3 -4.9111 -4.3516 -1.6613 2.0407
αg4 -4.8795 -4.4867 -1.8957 2.3619
αg5 -3.9706 -4.4866 -1.8957 2.3618
αg6 -4.8794 -5.9394 -4.15 1.6852
edu_f -2.4847 -3.2026 -0.7906 -0.0887*
edu_m -1.0169 -0.077* -0.3251 -0.7607
bluec_f 1.0425 1.3045 1.128 0.5129
bluec_m -0.2322 0.9441 0.8857 0.3101*
self_f -1.8988 1.1488 0.9409 0.2765
self_m -2.8585 0.5979 0.9206 0.1454*
unempl_f -0.1004* 1.1899 1.0258 3.2324
unempl_m -0.352 0.607 0.8484 -0.1579
north -2.6503 -0.0525* -0.2389 -0.1801
south 2.3323 0.1979 -0.0156* -0.2502
female -2.1524 -0.0312* 0.0766* -0.2312
risk_av 0.1075 -0.0566
Note: All models include a set of nine 5-years age dummies. All coefficients
are significant at the 1% level except those with *.
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Table 5: Appendix. Parameter estimates: Model 2
Transition to Elementary to Junior high to Senior high to
elementary junior high senior high college
αg1 -3.8266 -1.765 -0.2272 0.6548
αg2 -3.817 -1.6692 -0.2249 0.6057
αg3 -3.8028 -1.611 -0.2114 0.5602
αg4 -4.0597 -1.6197 -0.21 0.56
αg5 -3.9706 -1.6112 -0.2083 0.5557
αg6 -4.0564 -1.7025 -0.2265 0.5726
edu_f -1.6834 -2.0917 -1.8599 -0.5224
edu_m -0.4712 -2.5042 -1.4438 -0.386
bluec_f 2.5779 0.5697 1.4876 0.9129
bluec_m 0.1269 0.7332 0.7537 0.8483
self_f 1.566 0.524 1.2237 0.5723
self_m -0.7616 0.6104 0.4573 0.4472
unempl_f -0.0225 0.6835 1.6748 3.2276
unempl_m -0.9491 -1.0875 0.4225 0.7258
north -0.359 -1.0324 -0.4563 0.119
south 1.7296 -0.6568 -0.0644 0.0521
female 0.3283 0.2476 0.1203 0.0858
risk_av -0.3707 1.2131
Note: All models include a set of nine 5-years age dummies. All coefficients
are significant at the 1% level except those with *.
40
Table 6: Appendix. Parameter estimates: Model 3
Transition to Elementary to Junior high to Senior high to
elementary junior high senior high college
αg1 -2.9744 -1.8698 -0.4086 0.6141
αg2 -2.3444 -1.6524 -0.3358 0.5622
αg3 -2.2199 -1.5477 -0.2857 0.5314
αg4 -2.2273 -1.5426 -0.2816 0.5311
αg5 -2.0871 -1.4956 -0.2452 -0.2974
αg6 -2.2061 -1.9941 -0.4321 0.5793
edu_f -1.6913 -2.0804 -1.8771 -0.5579
edu_m -0.4773 -2.4979 -1.4572 -0.4089
bluec_f 2.3385 0.5197 1.119 0.8386
bluec_m 0.0499 0.641 0.632 0.8275
self_f 1.4484 0.4202 0.9792 0.5326
self_m -0.803 0.5115 0.3445 0.4377
unempl_f -0.0233 0.6839 1.6665 3.2248
unempl_m -1.2105 -1.0205 -0.0052 0.5889
north -0.4494 -1.0296 -0.7037 0.034
south 1.4743 -0.7093 -0.3652 -0.0251
female 0.2883 0.2392 0.0252 0.056
risk _av 0.9088
Note: All models include a set of nine 5-years age dummies. All coefficients
are significant at the 1% level except those with *.
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